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Soon after taking power, three leaders of nonviolent African independence movements, Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia immediately turned to violent means to 
suppress internal opposition. The paper examines the reasons for the success of their Gandhian nonviolent 
tactics in ousting British colonial governments and argues that these new heads of state lost confidence in 
nonviolence due to a mixture of self-serving expediency, a lack of understanding of nonviolence's many 
different forms, and the constraints of inheriting a state already dependent on the use of force. 
 
1. Introduction 
The three famous heads of State who led their respective countries from colonial 
rule to independence—Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Kambarage Nyerere of 
Tanzania, and Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia—all advocated nonviolent 
resistance against the colonial powers. Each came to power without having to 
organize armed resistance against the colonizers. They praised mass nonviolent action 
for its ability to encourage otherwise superior armed powers to capitulate to their 
demands and looked forward to leading their countries in a humane and democratic 
fashion. After taking office, each faced internal dissent or stiff opposition. In such 
circumstances, and to different degrees, they called upon the coercive power of the 
Western-style States that they inherited. Each concluded that to rule a country in non-
violent fashion was impossible.  
In this paper, I will explore several questions. First, what characteristics of 
nonviolence make it at first an able tool for those protesting their oppression? Why 
does maintaining nonviolence become difficult, causing the protestors to resort to 
coercion and force after gaining the reins of State power? Is this difficulty a sign that 
nonviolence has limited usefulness, or does it indicate a need to change the structure 
and behavior of States? Have any authors addressed the issue of what nonviolence 
from a position of state power would look like?   
I will also discuss Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda’s positions on nonviolence and 
violence. Many whole books already discuss these three figures and their uses of 
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violence and nonviolence. This paper, limited in scope, could never do justice if I 
attempted to pass judgment on the efficacy or morality of their statesmanship. For 
manageability, I will focus on the time just prior to, and just after they won 
independence. I will focus on the apparent contradiction that the same men who 
experienced the efficacy of nonviolence against the British colonial powers in their 
countries abandoned nonviolence as soon as fellow Africans challenged them in their 
countries. I will include discussion of interviews with Nyerere and Kaunda found in 
Guns and Gandhi in Africa: PanAfrican Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle, 
and Liberation in Africa.1 Co-author Bill Sutherland draws upon his first-hand 
experience as an AfricanAmerican who came to Ghana to work with Nkrumah in the 
1950s. He gives us some insights into the troubles and transformations that Nkrumah 
experienced.   
As a background for these three cases, I will briefly compare aspects of colonial 
rule to pre-colonial governance in Africa, and current Western-based models of 
democracy. While the European governments that ruled African countries had some 
amount of representative democracy at home, they ruled their colonies in an 
authoritarian fashion. The goal of colonial government was efficient administration. 
They instilled a repressive order to facilitate an economy based on extraction of 
resources from Africa and marketing of massproduced European goods to Africans.2 
As historian of Africa Basil Davidson notes, Europeans never had preparing Africans 
for self-rule as one of the goals of their administration of the colonies. This deficit 
was a factor in the shaky transition from colonial rule to self-rule. Instead, colonial 
government provided examples of the use of coercive power—dictatorship—instead 
of democracy.3 
Mahmood Mamdani, in his studies of colonial rule in Africa, notes that British 
colonial powers ruled through “decentralized despotism.” Colonists would conquer an 
area militarily, but strike an agreement with reigning chiefs and kings to let them 
continue in their positions of local power if they would accept the ultimate authority 
of the British. They gave local chiefs broad powers to rule in any way they saw fit as 
long as they turned over the required amount of taxes to the colonial government. 
Where the British did not find people organized by ethnicity and ruled by a chief, for 
example in a community self-governed by age sets or in a series of very small 
communities, they gladly amalgamated people into “tribes” and gave them a 
“chief”—doing some creative tradition-making.4 Striking a deal with local leaders 
from whom they might otherwise strip of all power appeared to be culturally sensitive 
but was actually quite manipulative. Peasants more readily accepted the continued 
rule of their traditional leaders and so did not fight the British directly. If disputes 
arose, the people usually directed their anger at their local leadership which had to 
absorb the shocks that came with changes under colonialism.  
There was a crucial difference between pre-colonial and colonial rule. In pre-
colonial times, the relationship between the ruler and their people had a series of 
checks and balances. A chief would consult key parties before making any ruling. An 
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emphasis on maintaining community consensus ensured that the leaders would hear 
legitimate concerns of the community and the people would not be marginalized. 
People had official channels to dissent from rulings of their leaders. Most 
communities understood that the chief, while having authority to make decisions, got 
that authority from the consent of the people.5 Were the people to disapprove of the 
chief and withdraw their consent, the chief could be removed. Once chiefs accepted 
British authority, their dependence on the consent of those ruled disappeared. A chief 
could make unpopular rulings and the people would be surprised to find out that the 
British curtailed their ability to oust the unresponsive chief. For example, if peasants 
refused to pay their taxes, the chief could call upon the military power of the British to 
ensure that the tax was collected. Therefore, while the situation might appear similar 
to the pre-colonial set-up, at the heart of things, there had been a radical change in 
power relations.  
Now, according to theorist on nonviolence Gene Sharp, the people always have 
the power to topple their government, which draws its power from the consent and 
cooperation of the governed. Sometimes the people (due to government repression) 
forget their power and presume that the government is a monolith which monopolizes 
all power, leaving them powerless. According to Sharp, nonviolent action can succeed 
when the people realize that they are the source of the dictator’s power. By 
withholding their cooperation, the dictator is rendered helpless. For example, if the 
people hold the purse strings to their rulers, they could threaten to cut off the ruler’s 
funds by refusing to pay taxes (as Henry David Thoreau suggested). In other 
situations, civil servants or soldiers could refuse to carry out their orders.6 
The situation gets more complicated when a foreign government props up a local 
government, as is the case in colonialism. Local peoples could withdraw support from 
the local ruler and refuse to cooperate or pay taxes. But if that ruler can call upon 
reinforcements from the colonizers, the people will still be oppressed. The only way 
to solve a problem like that is to reach the people of the country doing the 
repressing—which is what the movement for independence of African countries did. 
It tried to influence British citizens to pressure their government to be humane and 
offer colonies independence.  
Hannah Arendt has a theory of political action, which explains that power is the 
product of consent freely given between peers. When people decide to act together in 
concert, their actions are effective and they are powerful. Echoing Sharp’s description 
of the role of the people in propping up their leaders, Arendt explains that a leader can 
only be effective when the people support that leader. Arendt insists that the use of 
violence or coercion is the opposite of power. Rulers resort to violence and coercion 
when they feel their power slipping. When people no longer cooperate, rulers escalate 
to using violence. Violence is not a manifestation of power but a sign that power is 
diminishing.7 
Arendt’s analysis of power-violence dynamics is interesting. Using violence 
shows some amount of power: loyal troops, ability to gain supplies and hardware 
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needed to engage in acts of violence. A truly powerless leader would have no loyal 
followers to carry out his commands. But a government in trouble could draw upon a 
stockpile of weapons gained from earlier cooperation even if current subjects refuse to 
manufacture arms or send new supplies. Arendt’s point was that if the ruler were able 
to convince the people to cooperate, violence would be unnecessary. In this sense, the 
turn to violence represents a failure.  
Violence or coercion can succeed in its aims or not, depending on the reaction of 
those who bear its brunt. Sometimes victims of violence internalize its message and 
decide to submit, even changing their minds and deciding to cooperate with the 
system. At other times, people submit to coercion but internally remain set against the 
source of violence, vowing to act differently as soon as the coercive power remits. 
Arendt focuses on the second dynamic. She suggests that such violence will be self-
defeating since it does not change the minds of those for whom violence controls their 
outer actions. Those who have not been convinced wait for their opportunity to resist 
and will eventually do so. She notes warily that violence coupled with speech, often in 
the form of propaganda, can have the effect of convincing people to change their 
minds— and if so, changing minds and winning over wills helps a ruler who uses 
violence to regain power.8 
Taking the foregoing into account, the thesis we will explore is whether Nkrumah, 
Nyerere, and Kaunda turned to coercion or violence when they felt their power 
slipping. Having inherited states shaped by colonial powers, they were able to draw 
upon the means of coercive violence stockpiled there. This resort to violence was part 
of the colonial model of governing. Bill Sutherland argues that this quandary will lead 
us to question the structure of the state instead of questioning nonviolence. At closing, 
we will explore this suggestion of Sutherland’s.  
We can see another dynamic in Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda’s use of violence. 
Each begins to use violence and repression as soon he was in the seat of power, a 
perspective from which it may appear that each was immune to retaliation. The 
British, with their army, could seem capable of harmful retaliation. Strategically, 
violence would not easily succeed against them. But those who bore the brunt of 
repression in the newly independent states were not well armed or organized. 
“Preventive detention” or outright killing could swiftly crush them. This idea of 
immunity to the repercussions of violence is, according to the above account of 
Arendt and Sharp, an illusion. But it is almost an optical illusion to the person in 
power, for whom the benefits of violence and oppression appear so concrete, with 
future reprisal a more distant and speculative result. The irony is, as nonviolent 
activists, each of the three had been hoping to induce some clear vision in the British, 
who had been in their position not long ago.  
2. Kwame Nkrumah  
During the 1940s, Nkrumah had lived in the United States and England, where he 
obtained education on a wide range of political theories. He also attended the Fifth 
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Pan-African Congress in 1945, from which came a common platform for 
independence movements based largely on Mahatma Gandhi’s recently successful 
fight for independence in India. The platform held that independence would have to 
be a broad-based people’s movement and that freedom from colonialism, in the form 
of African socialism, would be won by the means of “positive action” which would 
refrain from violence.9 
Gandhi’s influence in Ghana also came through Ghanaian soldiers who had fought 
for Britain during World War II. Housed at a big camp for Commonwealth soldiers in 
Durban, Geoffrey Adumah explained that Indians in South Africa challenged them, 
saying, why are you fighting for the freedom of the British if you are not free in 
Ghana? Why should 5,000 Britons rule over two million Africans? It was there that 
they heard of Gandhi’s nonviolent struggle in India. When the 65,000 ex-Servicemen 
returned to Ghana, many of them gathered in 1948 to write up and deliver a petition to 
the Governor, but police fired upon them as they marched to the Governor’s 
residence, and three were killed. In response, people following the marchers returned 
to Accra and rioted, burning stalls and stores, houses, and European cars. Komla 
Gbedema explained that the looting was fueled not only by frustration with the police 
over the shooting, but also by frustration with West African merchants who had been 
charging high prices in their stores. A nonviolent boycott had already been underway 
to put pressure on the merchants, but with emotions running high, the stores were 
attacked. Within a month twenty nine died and 237 were injured.10 In such a situation, 
emphasizing nonviolent discipline was a challenge.   
Nkrumah was not alone in trying to combine the insights derived from Karl 
Marx’s critique of capitalism—exposing colonial exploitation—with the non-Marxist 
idea that the struggle against capitalists could be won without violence. He led a 
successful positive action campaign during 1950–1951 to pressure Great Britain to 
grant internal self-rule to Ghana. He described positive action, in speeches and a 
widely-distributed pamphlet, as comprising strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation. As 
Nkrumah later explained, “We had no guns, but even if we had, the circumstances 
were such that non-violent alternatives were open to us, and it was necessary to try 
them before resorting to other means.”11 In this quote Nkrumah shows himself as 
committed to the tactics of nonviolence, but not spiritually and morally committed to 
creedal nonviolence in the Gandhian sense.  
In Nkrumah’s autobiography, we see his uncertainty during his first use of 
positive action. He had met with Reginald Harry Saloway, the Colonial Secretary, to 
warn him of the impending action. Saloway argued that positive action would bring 
chaos and disorder. He charged that Africans could not be as successful as Indians 
could in using the method because Indians had practice in suffering pain and 
deprivation (alluding presumably to a tradition of Hindu asceticism) while Africans 
did not. For example, Gandhi’s use of general strike drew heavily on the concept and 
tradition of “hartal,” a day of mourning, familiar to Hindus.12 
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Regardless, Nkrumah still called for positive action on 8 January 1950. He called 
a general strike, suggesting everyone should stay home from work. By 10 January that 
year, he noticed that enthusiasm was waning and some stores reopened on 11 January. 
He wondered whether Saloway was right— whether Africans could not muster the 
discipline for nonviolent action. Fortunately, happy circumstances re-galvanized the 
movement that day. Walking through town, wondering what he would next do, a 
crowd began to gather and follow him. Before long, a large crowd gathered in front of 
the Evening News office. Addressing the people there, he asked everyone to fill Accra 
arena that evening. His speech at the arena, followed by favorable news coverage, got 
the movement back on its feet.13 Gandhi often emphasized the role of the press in a 
successful nonviolent action.  
That instance of positive action met with challenges. Editors who wrote 
sympathetic reports were arrested on charges of sedition. During violent outbreaks, 
provoked by the police, protestors killed two police. The British arrested Nkrumah 
and charged him with organizing an illegal strike. They reasoned that the purpose of 
the strike was not to solve a labor dispute but to pressure the government. They tried, 
unsuccessfully, to hold him accountable for the deaths of the two police officers. 
Still, not long after the general strike, the British agreed to internal governance. 
Nkrumah was elected as Leader of Government Business within the internal self-
government.14 Sutherland and Meyer describe the use of positive action by Ghanaians 
as “a phenomenal success for Gandhian strategy.”15 By 1957, Great Britain granted 
Ghana independence. Nkrumah became Ghana’s first president.  
Sutherland’s first-hand experience with nonviolence goes far back into the 1940s 
and 1950s when he served a four-year prison sentence for being a conscientious 
objector after refusing the drafted during the Second World War. He was a co-founder 
of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). During the 1950s, nonviolent activists 
from abroad, including African Americans like Sutherland and Bayard Rustin, came 
to Ghana to show support for Nkrumah. They built on the beginnings of the 
nonviolent movement that had catapulted the president to power in an independent 
African state. Sutherland was also fleeing McCarthyism in the United States and 
looking for a place where he could express his political ideas freely.16 
Sutherland’s commitment to nonviolence contrasted with Nkrumah’s. 
Sutherland’s actions mirrored developments in nonviolence used in the Civil Rights 
Movement in the United States. On one occasion, he and Bayard Rustin, among 
Ghanaians and other Africans, joined the Sahara Protest Team. They went up through 
northern Ghana to what was then Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) to protest French 
nuclear testing in the desert. They intended to blockade the entrance to the facility to 
draw attention to the ways in which the arms race was continuing in Africa. The 
Convention People’s Party supported their action. Abraham Johannes (“A.J.”) Muste 
was uncomfortable with the official government support of the nonviolent action since 
he had difficulty believing that any state, including Nkrumah’s, was truly devoted to 
nonviolence. Sutherland explains that Nkrumah supported their efforts because he 
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wanted Ghana to be critical of the arms race. At the same time, Nkrumah was moving 
away from nonviolence as a method.17 
 Encouraged by the success of positive action in the early 1950s, many nonviolent 
activists had come to Ghana. When Muste, Ralph Abernathy, and others suggested, at 
a Positive Action Conference in Ghana in 1960, that a Pan-African nonviolence 
training camp be set up, Africans in attendance thought that these international 
advisors were dangerously romantic. Sutherland remembers Frantz Fanon giving a 
very sober and soft-spoken argument about the unfortunate necessity of violence in 
the cause of liberation. 
Afterward, Sutherland received a letter from Nkrumah saying they were going to 
set up an ideological school in Winneba, Ghana, and that a wing of the school would 
be devoted to nonviolence training where Sutherland could have a role in teaching. 
They did build the center at Winneba, but the nonviolence wing never materialized. 
Sutherland and Meyer bemoan, “The nonviolence advocacy so prominent in the 1958 
All-African Peoples Conference, in the 1959 Sahara Protest Teams, and in the 
planning for the 1960 Positive Action Conference were all but eliminated from the 
mainstream of political discourse.”18 
From its beginning, many problems beset the Ghanaian government headed by 
Nkrumah. Some authors speculate that from the start, the British governor, Arden 
Clark, negotiated the steps of independence in a way that a neo-colonial pattern was 
inevitable. In this “battle of wits” Nkrumah failed to beat his experienced opponent.   
Marika Sherwood wrote, “Nkrumah was a multilayered man and the world in 
which he operated was fractious and highly exploitative.”19 Under such 
circumstances, success would be difficult. Nkrumah’s exposure to a wide range of 
political and economic philosophies was a strength, but he could not meld these 
differing views and influences into a coherent and practical political philosophy and 
plan of action.20 
Commentators have often suggested that United States’ businesses manipulated 
Nkrumah into taking out a huge loan to fund the Upper Volta River Dam project, 
plunging Ghana country into indebtedness.21 Nkrumah, who often saw destructive 
meddling of the United States in every coup attempt across Africa (including the 
eventual coup against him), never complained about the United States’ role in the dam 
project. To the end, he defended his decision to build the dam as necessary for the 
economic independence of Ghana and West Africa.22 
An oft-repeated history of Nkrumah’s fall from power cites his increasing 
repression in the face of threats to his rule. While initially popular due to his funding 
of education and health care, indebtedness resulted from the projects. A “loyal 
opposition,” comprised of traditional chiefs led by Joseph Kwame Kyeretwi Boakye 
(J. B.) Danquah, who intended to rule Ghana upon its independence, had always 
existed in the country. These chiefs felt betrayed by the British when the reins of 
power were handed over to the young Nationalists—Nkrumah and his Congress 
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People’s Party. Nkrumah, for his part, did not want the country run by “illiterates” 
whom he viewed as compromised by their years of cooperation with the colonial 
forces.23 
When cocoa prices dropped on the market, compounded by Nkrumah taxing 
cocoa to fund national development, disgruntlement began in earnest. Nkrumah insists 
that the farmers, at first, supported the use of cocoa funds for development, but then 
politicians manipulated them to oppose it. He described the forces that eventually 
rallied against him as tripartite: local “reactionaries,” the chiefs and the foreign-
educated middle class; foreign-trained army officers; and the foreign imperialists and 
neo-colonialists, Britain and the United States.24 
In response to challenges to his policies, Nkrumah set up a series of increasingly 
repressive laws. Government could jail people without trial if they were deemed 
security risks. Beginning in 1961, anyone guilty of insulting Nkrumah could get a 
three-year prison sentence. In 1961, when a general strike was organized to protest 
against him (now on the receiving end of positive action), he took command of the 
armed forces. In 1964, he declared Ghana a one-party state. In his last two years in 
office, he withdrew into isolation, in great part out of fear of attempts on his life.25 He 
explained that he was in favor of one-party states only when the one party was 
committed to socialism, since a socialist party would be committed to “the will of the 
masses working for the ultimate good and welfare of the people as a whole” instead of 
to one class or another as in the two-party British system. He would be against one-
party states run by neo-colonialists or tyrants. From his perspective, controlling 
multiple parties, which might break up along religious or ethnic lines, was a necessary 
measure in a time of national emergency when the security of the State was at stake. 
At first forcing all opposition groups to merge into one, he later tired of the “disunity” 
and “confusion” stirred up by the opposition party and banned it in 1964.26 
Arguably, this pattern of increasing coercive measures was a sign, not of increased 
power, but of his losing power as Arendt describes. To be sure, Nkrumah was up 
against formidable opponents and his opponents were able to use the media to win 
people’s minds and cooperation away from his policies. Ghana gained its 
independence during the Cold War when superpowers fought over spheres of 
influence in ways that could turn smaller African countries into political footballs. 
Regardless, while the coup-plotters did use some violence to attain their goal, to an 
extent, as Gene Sharp’s theory would predict, their job was easier because people no 
longer wanted to stand in solidarity with Nkrumah. He recounts with bitterness how 
his most trusted aides quickly abandoned him upon news of the coup. In such a 
context, retaining power was exceedingly difficult.  
Nkrumah does not admit that the coup against him had popular support. He argues 
instead that his officers did not fight but capitulated because they were surprised with 
a fait accompli. He also argues that many officers of the armed forces were British-
trained and unduly susceptible to British propaganda claiming that he was a dictator.27 
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Nonviolent activists counter that the ability of one person to disrupt an assembly is 
a sign of tacit acceptance by all those who remain silent and do not stop the disruptive 
one. No one rising up to stop the coup was a sign that Nkrumah’s rule was largely 
unpopular.   
Nkrumah’s “personal ruling style” was autocratic. Would his policies have 
succeeded if he had adopted a different ruling style? His underlying political 
philosophies were also conflicted. While he adopted the Gandhian techniques of 
positive action advocated by the Fifth Pan-African Congress, Marxism also greatly 
influenced his thinking.   
Marx held that rule by force is necessary because those in power will not willingly 
give up their power in deference to moral arguments, for example. Likewise, a need 
exists for a “vanguard”—those politically educated intellectuals who can better 
understand the true interests of the masses, since the proletarians (in this case, the 
peasants) might have an erroneous idea of what is in their best interest.   
Seeing himself as an enlightened “vanguard,” deciding to use force on his people, 
for their own good, was an easy step to take.28 Earlier gains that resulted from 
working with the people nonviolently for change could appear cumbersome, 
especially when reaching agreement on a wide range of issues no longer looks easy. 
Getting the people to do things by force and coercion, as did the colonial government 
before, could appear to be a productive shortcut.   
Nkrumah comes across as someone in a hurry to bring the gains of socialism and 
independence to his people. He later suggested that gaining independence 
nonviolently may have been a drawback. He conjectured that had they won 
independence by armed struggle, they could have established socialism 
immediately.29 
But to imagine that violence would have been a better foundation for socialism 
may be unrealistic. In some cases (Ethiopia, for example), socialist governments 
founded in violence have not always worked well. The issues are complicated; many 
books have been written on the topic. We cannot easily resolve the issues here. For 
our purposes, we see that Nkrumah, looking over the years of his rule and his eventual 
ousting and exile, was quicker to doubt his use of nonviolence than his use of 
coercion and violence. In his later book, Handbook for Revolutionary Warfare, he 
called war logical and inevitable. He claimed that in Africa there was no alternative.30 
Sutherland recounted his objection to Nkrumah’s Preventive Detention Law 
instituted in 1960. He wrote Nkrumah a confidential letter outlining why he thought 
the policy was wrong. Soon afterward, Nkrumah’s Secretary of Home Affairs, Krobo 
Edusi, told Sutherland he was lucky that Nkrumah did not have him deported 
immediately. Edusi warned Sutherland not to bother the president with such matters in 
the future. He was not deported, but the incident encouraged him to think of leaving. 
He packed his bags and set off for Tanganyika (later Tanzania). As he explained, with 
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his desire to spread the knowledge of techniques of nonviolent action to other parts of 
Africa, he was drawn to both Nyerere and Kaunda.31 
3. Julius Nyerere  
Present-day Tanzania was earlier called German East Africa on the mainland, later 
to be called Tanganyika when it became a British League of Nations mandate in 1920. 
In 1946 it became a United Nations Trust Territory under British administration. 
Zanzibar, the island off the coast of the mainland, became a British protectorate in 
1890. Each got its independence separately from Britain, the former in 1961 and the 
latter in 1963. In 1964 they joined together to create Tanzania. Originally colonized 
by Germany, Africans rose up against their colonizers in the Maji Maji Rebellion in 
1905–1906, in which 120,000 people were killed through fighting or starvation. In 
1914–1916, the British fought and captured the mainland territory from the Germans.   
 Julius Nyerere, a schoolteacher educated at Makerere University in Uganda, was 
involved in the creation of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the 
movement for self-government in Tanganyika since the early 1950s. During this 
struggle, he had traveled to Britain to forge working relations with the British Labour 
Party. He also went to the United States to speak before the United Nations and to 
meet with the Maryknoll Fathers, with whom he shared many ideals. Nyerere believed 
Tanganyika received independence without fighting because there were few white 
settlers in the country and it was economically underdeveloped.32 Luckily he received 
cooperation from the last British governor of Tanganyika, Sir Richard Turnbull. Mark 
K. Smith argues that “Nyerere’s integrity, ability as a political orator and organizer, 
and readiness to work with different groupings was a significant factor in 
independence being achieved without bloodshed.”33 He became prime minister of 
independent Tanganyika in 1961, a position from which he quickly resigned, and then 
was elected president in 1962.   
While Nyerere has been widely respected throughout his long career, he has 
upheld certain restrictive legal aspects of the Tanzanian government similar to those 
in Nkrumah’s Ghana, such as the use of preventive detention, creation of a one-party 
state, and the broadening of the powers of the president. John Hatch noted that some 
journalists speculated the reason Nyerere so soon stepped down from the position of 
prime minister was to avoid direct responsibility for the soon-passed Preventive 
Detention Act and the banning of unions. Nyerere always defended the new 
government’s actions, even when he was not the one in charge.34 
In his speeches and writings, Nyerere emphasized the values of peace, freedom, 
and unity. While violence might be able to destroy the old colonial system, it could 
not build up the new free society. While Nyerere did not hold a strict nonviolent 
position, he did claim that violence should only be used as a last resort.35 In an 
interview with Sutherland and Meyer just prior to his death, Nyerere explained that 
although he is a Christian, he could never agree with “Do not kill, full stop.”36 People 
sometimes have no choice but to use violence against an oppressive state. He 
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explained that his own stand on nonviolence was not “philosophical” but merely 
practical. He reflected that his reputation as an advocate of nonviolence might have 
been built during the time of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. He tried to encourage 
Tanganyikans to renounce violence in their independence movement. But he could 
not insist that all hold the same position regardless of circumstances. He described the 
context of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s as a continent manipulated by superpowers 
in a Cold War. Success of the independence movement was the most important goal. 
Any violence happening in South Africa, for example, was the fault of the apartheid 
regime, not the liberation movement. The extent of depending on violence as a tactic 
differed from country to country. The African National Congress (ANC) had an 
extensive political network; their violent actions were more like propaganda—meant 
to send a serious message but not capable of military victory. But in Mozambique and 
Angola, armed movements such as the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 
and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had little or no 
political structure or communications capability. They were only an army; so only 
military means were available to them. To give up the option of violence would be to 
completely dismantle the only existing movement for liberation. But the Tanzanian 
opportunity for liberation was different, and he explained: “I didn’t want bloodshed 
for nothing, because it was possible for us without it.” 37 
Nyerere impressed nonviolent activists with his statements upon Tanganyika’s 
independence, which came in the context of a growing arms race between the 
superpowers. He said disarmament would be a good thing. He also stated that his 
country and many countries in Africa were not armed. To set an example for the 
superpowers, he suggested that newly independent African countries should not arm 
themselves. After all, why would they need an army? Their immediate neighbors were 
not planning on attacking them.   
In 1964, when Tanzania had only about 2000 armed soldiers, some of the soldiers 
in the Calito barracks on the outskirts of Dar es Saalam decided to mutiny. They were 
protesting serving under British officers, and wanted better pay. More labor dispute 
than an attempted coup or protest against the government, the soldiers still were 
armed and dangerous. They marched on Nyerere’s residence. He wanted to reason 
with them, but his wife and aides insisted he flee. After all, at this time, many coup 
attempts on African leaders were occurring. Nyerere finally called the British to 
request help. As Hatch describes the scenario, “This contravened every belief he had 
fought for, affronted every instinct, and gave him a deep sense of shame he could not 
assuage for many months.”38 
Tanzanians saw their government as quite weak if a handful of soldiers could 
challenge it so easily. After the British forces handled the situation, Nyerere asked if 
the British troops in Tanzania could be replaced with African soldiers. Nigerian 
soldiers (who were still part of the British army) took over the duties of the white 
British soldiers. Subsequently, Nyerere decided he must train a new defense force. He 
ensured that a significant part of their training was political education so that they 
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would understand and uphold the ethics and objectives of their government. This 
experience convinced him of the necessity of armed forces for any State. He sent his 
own sons to China to do military training.39 
Nyerere supported guerrilla fighting against Portugese colonizers in Angola and 
Mozambique, practically bankrupting Tanzania in the process. He also supported the 
toppling of the regime in Comoros in 1975, and in Seychelles in 1977. Idi Amin’s 
Ugandan forces attacked Tanzania in 1978, in retaliation for Tanzania supporting 
groups hostile to his regime. It took the Tanzanians months to mobilize their troops, 
but when they finally did, they drove the Ugandan forces out of Tanzania, and then 
12,000 of their troops occupied part of Uganda. The Organization of African Unity 
condemned Tanzania for the foray into a foreign country.40 Needless to say, while 
these military adventures were far from his earlier nonviolent approach, he was loved 
across Africa for his devotion to the cause of liberation.  
Nyerere disagreed with Sutherland’s criticism of Nkrumah’s use of preventive 
detention. He claimed that Tanzania needed the same kind of laws. He reasoned that 
while they should prevent torture and abusive situations in detention, defending the 
security of the nation is necessary. Preventive detention is justified because 
community comes before individual rights. He argued that  
African countries are no different from many other states: courts are significant, 
but “when the security of the nation is threatened, the court system is not enough.” 41 
This recent expression in Nyerere’s interview with Sutherland is the same as his 1964 
speech at the University College of Dar es Saalam. Then he argued that the Preventive 
Detention Law was “an inevitable part of my responsibilities of President of the 
Republic.”While he retained defending the rights and freedoms of each individual as a 
worthy ideal, he argued, “our ideals must guide us, not blind us.”42 
Let us look at the details of Tanzania’s situation that appear to have led Nyerere to 
conclude he had no choice other than preventive detention. Reginald Herbold Green 
explains that under Nyerere’s rule and even up to the 1990s, the effectiveness of the 
rule of law in Tanzania was limited. Lower courts were often incompetent. 
Participation in the courts was expensive. Local people often could not understand 
what went on in the court. Revisions to law were slowly and sporadically recorded 
and implemented. The police and prosecutors were under-funded, understaffed, and 
often lack expertise. Under such circumstances, investigations and prosecutions were 
of poor quality. Because of this, “the government has not infrequently lost cases with 
significant political overtones.”43 
A 1978 Amnesty International report said that “Indefinite detention without trial 
continues to be the means favored by the [Tanzanian] Government to deal with any 
alleged offence (including corruption) when it fears that it has insufficient evidence 
for a trial.”44 Nyerere thought of preventive detention as unfortunate, but better than 
alternatives like rigging trials, or suffering a coup perpetrated by unstoppable 
opponents.45 
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How did Tanganyika and Zanzibar legislate and practice preventive detention? 
James S. Read outlines several laws that allowed the Executive to detain persons 
without judicial intervention. One was part of the colonial legacy, called the 
Deportation Ordinance of 1921. To combat growing nationalism in its colony, the 
government could restrict the movement of a subject to a small area—in effect, 
detaining them. It provided an early model for the later Preventive Detention Act, 
instituted one year after independence. With this new act, the government gained the 
ability to detain anyone without charges secretly and for any length of time. The act 
gave the president very broad powers. Based on mere subjective factors, he can decide 
to detain anyone he suspects will breach peace and good order, or who might 
jeopardize the defense and security of the State.46 
Under the Refugees Control Act of 1966, refugees had even fewer rights than 
Tanzanians under the Preventive Detention Act. A government minister had the 
power to detain refugees that were believed to be harming Tanzania’s relationship 
with another government. The act also allowed detention of any refugee whom the 
government thought had probably committed a crime in another country. The refugee 
had no chance for legal defense, did not have to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the government had no duty to state the reason for the detention.   
The Political Officers’ Power of Arrest allowed regional and area commissioners 
to detain suspects for up to forty-eight hours while they awaited appearance before a 
magistrate. Zanzibar, which had internal self-rule, drafted its own Preventive 
Detention Decree the year after Tanginyika, in 1964.47 
To what use were preventive detention laws put during Nyerere’s presidency? 
According to Read, Tanzania drafted the Preventive Detention Law to deal with a 
developing confrontation with trade unions. The government worried that strikes by 
workers would hurt the national economy. During Nyerere’s presidency, estimates of 
the number of people detained were in the thousands. In 1977, Amnesty International 
knew the names of 141 known political detainees.48 
Under the Refugee Act—which amounted to legal abuse—leaders of liberation 
movements in other countries were encouraged to bring their prisoners to Tanzania to 
be held in custody. In 1978, Nyerere finally ordered the release “of twenty members 
of South African liberation movements, including eleven [South West African 
People’s Organization] SWAPO members who had been arrested in Zambia (where 
detainees are protected by justifiable constitutional guarantees) and transferred to 
Tanzania. Some of these had been detained for up to seven years.” Read suggests that 
the most unfortunate aspect of the act was the impression it created that “personal 
liberty was at the disposal of the authorities, to be granted or withheld at will, rather 
than a basic right enjoyed by every individual.”49 People were at the mercy of those 
who might be acting out of jealousy or revenge. Not all cases of detention appear 
justifiable.   
Read does credit Nyerere with keeping the ideal of rights and freedom alive in 
people’s minds, even during all the years that he claimed the practical necessity of 
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overriding those rights. Tanzania amended the Preventive Detention Act in 1985 to 
strengthen the rights of detainees, although it still fell short on several key issues. In 
Nyerere’s last term of office, the Tanzanian people finally passed a Bill of Rights that 
provided them legal defense.50 
Nyerere also advocated one-party rule for Tanzania, run by his party, TANU. As 
he explained, his party was based on equality, respect, freedom, and unity, all of 
which would be of great service to Tanzanians—so how could he allow opposition to 
those principles?51 
In the beginning, Tanganyika was de facto one-party, since voters cast 1,127,978 
votes for Nyerere compared to Zuberi Mtemvu’s 21,276 votes. By the 1965 elections, 
the constitution supported a one-party system. Nyerere espoused his rationale that one 
party could reach out to the people and widen citizen participation so that a narrow 
group of professional politicians would not win the elected seats. Subsequently, voter 
participation rose from less than twenty-five percent in 1961 to over seventy-five 
percent in 1965.52 
Still, not all Tanzanians were happy with a one-party government. Aikael N. 
Kweka explained that in this context offering criticism of the way things were done 
was difficult, since criticism was considered disloyalty to TANU. Nyerere 
emphasized that although there would be only one party, people should feel free to 
express their opinions, even criticizing the government. But in 1965, two Ministers of 
Parliament were expelled from the party for criticizing it and they lost their seats in 
Parliament. This harsh treatment sent a message to other politicians. The problem, 
Kweka explains, is, “Although the people were told that they were free to criticize, 
they did not know when this would be taken for opposition or even considered 
harmful to the State.”53 Because of these practices, some people experienced the Party 
as oppressive and undemocratic.  
Nyerere repeatedly emphasized the importance of democracy, but he thought that 
socialism had to alleviate dire poverty and bring about a certain level of economic 
equality before democracy could have any genuine meaning. As Green explained, 
hunger and never-ending work schedules robbed many people of experiencing other 
freedoms enshrined in the concepts of human rights.54 
While apparently putting rights on the back burner, Nyerere appeared to want to 
include grassroots participation in decision making regarding economic development. 
He often (although not consistently) emphasized decentralization of decision making 
to local communities.   
In his political leadership, Nyerere did not insist on self-importance. He wanted to 
be treated as an ordinary person and not a master over others. He insisted that leaders 
should not be arrogant or oppressive.55 His position on one-party states, he explained, 
was flexible. By 1986, he realized that the oneparty style of government in Tanzania 
was doing more harm than good, and that TANU needed to be shaken up and jolted 
into taking responsibility and doing a good job or risk being voted out by a rival 
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party.56 In 1990, he stated that suggesting multi-party democracy in Tanzania would 
not treasonous. The one-party system had been a historical necessity, but that could 
change. He set up a presidential commission and drew up a list of shortcomings of 
one-party democracy. Based on this, Parliament passed the Eighth Constitutional 
Amendment in 1992, allowing multiple parties.57 
Nyerere believed that coercion, as part of the responsibility of running a state, is 
unavoidable. Green summarized Nyerere’s position, “A legitimate State having 
reached a decision by legitimate methods has the duty as well as the right to enforce 
that decision.”58 A famous example was his compulsory relocation of people into 
villages so that all would have access to education and health facilities.  
Nyerere also defended his earlier idea that Africa should take the socialist road to 
development, through ujamaa (familyhood, emphasizing community and cooperative 
crop growing) villages. Under capitalism, he explained, Africa would always be a 
junior partner, dependent on foreign investment. He believed socialism to be more 
consistent with African values, although to choose it in the contemporary global 
context would not be easy. While Nyerere did force people to move, he did not coerce 
them to produce communally. There were incentives to do so but no legal penalties 
for not doing so.59 Sutherland offers his analysis, that bureaucrats working in the 
Tanzanian government stifled the ujamaa villages. We can imagine the frustration 
that Sutherland and others felt when they saw functionaries crush a good idea that 
enjoyed popular support.60 
Tanzania appeared to represent a chance for a socialist alternative to capitalist 
development voted in freely and led by a wise statesman. Unfortunately, those who 
either did not agree with the ideals of the new movement or could not set aside self-
interest to give the ideals a chance bogged down the project on intermediate levels.  
 It seems to this writer that Nyerere wanted to uphold the ideal of rights while 
allowing the flexibility to ignore rights when he deemed necessary. Immanuel Kant 
warned against this self-serving position on morality. He cautioned us about people 
who wanted others to uphold moral laws while exempting themselves.61 It is 
interesting that, despite Nyerere’s practices of preventive detention, he is popularly 
thought of as a great supporter of human rights, perhaps because of the role he played 
in the mid-1990s in trying to stop ethnic persecution in Burundi. Upon Nyerere’s 
death in 1999, an obituary noted, “Although he was harsh with his critics and detained 
some indefinitely without trial, Nyerere never acquired notoriety for human rights 
abuses.” 62 There are, however, a few critics: Smith notes that “There does appear to 
have been a disjucture between his commitment to human rights on the world stage, 
and his actions at home.” 63 Nyerere’s bold and confident statements regarding 
justifying his practice of preventive detention seem to point to little or no self-
recrimination on his part.   
Nyerere’s turn from nonviolence to violence was perhaps not that difficult for him 
because he hadn’t embraced nonviolence in a creedal, Gandhian way in the first place. 
His Christian background could just as well support a “just war” approach, and in fact 
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liberation theology was influencing Catholicism at that time. Nyerere’s support of 
noble causes, the “underdogs” against racist colonial government as well as home-
grown dictators like Amin, were easy candidates for just wars. However, Kaunda’s 
version of Christian thought brought him closer to Gandhian nonviolence, and so for 
Kaunda, the move from nonviolence to violence was more filled with self-
questioning.   
4. Kenneth Kaunda  
Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was one of the most 
outspoken supporters of nonviolent action. He was first introduced to Mahatma 
Gandhi’s writings by Rambhai Patel, a storekeeper in Lusaka. He described Gandhi’s 
method of satyagraha as “a lifebelt thrust into the hand of a drowning man.” 64 In 
1954, police searched his house and arrested him for having banned publications 
authored by Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. He spent two months in prison. In 1958, 
he visited India. When, in 1963, he received an honorary degree from Fordham 
University in the midst of the struggle for his country’s independence, he gave a great 
tribute to Gandhi and predicted that, like Gandhi, they would wear the British down 
until they finally got what they wanted. Throughout the struggle, Kaunda endorsed 
nonviolence and spoke against racialism. He told people not to attack white settlers. 
He hoped to win over white voters so that they would support him in a nonracial 
movement. He based his philosophy on Christianity, which he argued showed that 
Africans were human beings like anyone else. Despite these seeming assurances, the 
British increased security, suspecting that people could interpret his remarks as 
condoning attacks against material possessions such as railways, roads, and bridges.65 
The context in Northern Rhodesia was quite different from Tanzania. Many white 
settlers in Rhodesia were fighting against colonial rule. Fearing that white settler rule 
would be harsher than the British rule, Kaunda and his group opposed federation with 
Southern Rhodesia and insisted on remaining as a colony until the British would give 
the African majority self-rule. Kaunda was first involved with the Zambia Congress 
(ZANC) and worked with Harry Nkumbula. Later, while Kaunda and others were in 
jail, ZANC was banned. Other opposition groups joined together and founded the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP), which Kaunda headed upon his release 
from jail. They finally won independence in 1964.66 
Insisting on nonviolent discipline was not easy. Colin Legum comments that 
Kaunda’s staunch nonviolent stand is particularly amazing, considering that Algerians 
had already won their independence using violence, and South Africa, Zambia’s near 
neighbor, had rejected strict nonviolence in their own struggle in 1962. Legum was 
also concerned that the mood of angry frustration among Zambians made the 
nonviolent Kaunda an unlikely leader.67 Kaunda himself clarified that he thought 
some countries, like those African colonies ruled by Portugal, may have no option but 
to turn to violence, but that in his own country, it was still possible to reach the rulers 
with a conscience. He also iterated that the capabilities of nonviolence were still 
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largely undiscovered and that he estimated it was a method of great potential. On the 
level of propaganda, he admitted calculatedly, it is important not to lose the moral 
advantage which one receives by being the injured party. In the meantime he admitted 
that his own and others’ attempts to be nonviolent would be necessarily imperfect. He 
often admitted that officers of UNIP had been convicted of rioting, murder, assaults 
on the police and incitement to violence, but he never condoned this violence. Kaunda 
often cautioned that inability to get political progress constitutionally would put more 
pressure on his own people to turn to violence. Reflecting later on this early stage of 
the struggle, he noted that nonviolence works especially well if it is contrasted to 
immanent or existing violence, and he admits that he played the role of the rational 
alternative to the more violent movements in Zambia. 68 
In May 1959 a white woman, Mrs. Lilian Burton, was brutally killed in Zambia, 
and in response, the colonial government banned UNIP. The British blamed UNIP for 
an inability to control the people. But Kaunda, who was then in London, told the press 
that he regretted the attack and wanted to continue to persuade his people to stick to 
nonviolent discipline. He wrote a letter to family member Robert Burton in which he 
reiterated that love is a superior force and hate should be eschewed. A few weeks later 
he met with Robert Burton and other family members in London. Roy Welensky 
argued that Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod realized he needed to work with the 
nonviolent Kaunda, as an alternative to those who wanted to “shoot” their way to 
independence, and met with him in London that month. When Kaunda returned to 
Zambia he found that European settlers were engaged in a counter-terror response, 
with “hooligans” meting out punishment to random Africans. Kaunda denounced this 
reciprocal violence as well. 69 
Kaunda went on a 3,000 mile pilgrimage across Zambia, preaching nonviolence. 
Historian Fergus MacPherson explains that many Zambians “were explicit in the view 
that they ‘liked’ Kaunda’s leadership ‘because there was no bloodshed in his way of 
fighting for our freedom.’” 70 Zambians called their campaign for freedom “Cha Cha 
Cha” meaning, in rough translation, “face the music.” 71 They had huge bonfires of 
African Identification Certificates, reminiscent of Gandhi’s earlier burning of passes 
in South Africa. Not all Zambians could maintain nonviolence in the face of fierce 
provocation by government troops and police excesses. Up to Kaunda’s arrival in 
London to negotiate independence, he continued to appeal to those in his country to 
stop “stonings, assaults, unlawful assembly, riot, arson, murder, unlawful wounding 
and obstruction of the police.” 72 
North Rhodesia had its first African party government in the January 1964 
elections. During the campaigning, Kaunda had repeatedly preached against violent 
retaliation against whites. Just after the elections, he found his party and African rule 
attacked by a small group that rejected African nationalism and supported 
continuation of colonial rule. The Lumpa sect, which followed the prophetess, Alice 
Lenshina, was a local offshoot of Christianity based in Kaunda’s home district, 
Chinsali. Followers refused to obey the government and were hostile toward UNIP. 
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They built stockades around their villages and terrorized their neighbors. In the battles 
that ensued from July–October 1964, 700–1,500 people lost their lives.73 
What caused the Lumpa to rise up and fight UNIP? In the 1950s, the Lumpa were 
favorable to nationalism, but that changed by 1957. Nationalism focused on peasants, 
unlike the proletarians who flocked to UNIP. Andrew Roberts said UNIP had become 
a way of life, central to members’ identity. The members generally followed 
mainstream Christianity, so the increasing membership threatened the Lumpa religion. 
Wim van Binsbergen speculated that the Lumpa leadership benefited from colonial 
relations. They did not want Africans to rule them. Robert Kaunda, a deacon in the 
Lumpa church, went further and charged that agents of Welensky’s United Federal 
Party offered Alice Lenshina 8,000 pounds to break with UNIP, which she reluctantly 
accepted. This was interpreted as an attempt by Kaunda’s enemies to use the Lumpa 
to derail the new government. Lenshina warned her followers not to register to vote or 
hold a party card. They were advised not to honor the Zambian flag or national 
anthem. By 1964, they had forbidden their children to attend school and they 
barricaded themselves in their villages. Because the Lumpa opposed UNIP they were 
seen not only as political opponents of Kaunda but even as “enemies of the nation.” 74 
Although Kaunda agonized over the use of force against Lumpa intransigence and 
uprising, he continued the state of emergency started by the governor of Rhodesia up 
to 1972. MacPherson notes that “the baleful irony of the situation was that Governor 
Hone had to invoke, against the Lumpa sect, Emergency powers first enacted in the 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance by a virtually white Legislature to counter 
Kaunda’s movement for national sovereignty.” 75 Kaunda spoke on a radio broadcast 
and made a statement to the National Assembly explaining that “we are dealing with a 
completely fanatical sect whose members are not only prepared to die for their faith 
and consider it a passport to Heaven to do so, but who are also prepared to kill as 
many other people as they can before they die themselves.”76 He justified his use of 
force afterward, in many speeches suggesting that the Lumpa sect was engaged in 
sorcery and that his government was moral and Christian. In contrast to Kaunda’s 
militaristic approach, van Binsbergen thought that the country needed reconciliation 
between UNIP and the Lumpa. That happened slowly, culminating when their 
prophetess, who had been imprisoned, was finally released in 1975.77 
The Lumpa sect, and another called the “Watchtower,” which also rejected the 
new African-run state, comprised only five percent of the population. Could the new 
government allow them to question its authority? In addition, their small number 
made them an easy military target and the nature of their beliefs may have led Kaunda 
to believe that he could not reason with them. Were those two factors part of the true 
cause of his switch to violent methods?   
Kaunda seems quite reflective about the way in which he was forced, while in 
office, to change from the believer in nonviolence who challenges a government in 
power, to that of a head of state in charge of a military. He wrote The Riddle of 
Violence on the subject, published in 1980. In it he describes the dilemma of a ruler. 
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He described the strange feeling when one enters government for the first time, which 
seems like a new world. One walks the corridors where one’s opponents once resided 
and worked. When one earlier encouraged people to not pay taxes, one is now in the 
position of encouraging people to pay taxes. Where one once told people to boycott 
schools, one is now telling students to attend school. One also sees the “levers of 
power” under the surface, and one must banish the fond hope that one need not touch 
them. To stand by and do nothing while a small group arms itself and denies the 
legitimacy of the new government is not an act of innocence.78 He was pained by his 
decision to use force, perhaps because, as Arendt would say, conscience is the part of 
self that realizes through inner reflection the inconsistencies of ideals with each other 
or between ideals and actions.79 As he stated, “If we must even contemplate offering 
violence to our fellow human beings it is always better to do so against the pressure of 
an uneasy conscience.” 80 
Many of Kaunda’s statements in The Riddle of Violence show his frustration with 
his critics (whether external critics or his own conscience) which explains how he had 
no choice but to use the coercive machinery of the state to defend it against the 
Lumpa and other internal enemies. He challenges, people can’t seriously expect him 
as Head of State to dismantle the army and police, and empty the prisons. After all, 
one has to fight evil, it will not just go away of its own accord. Since dialogue alone 
can’t solve all problems, all states must use compulsion and violence. He explains that 
when they took over the Zambian state from the British, “we climbed on to an 
escalator already on the move, by which I mean that Zambia like every other state was 
already caught up in the vicious circle of violence.” 81 
Sutherland and Meyer had an opportunity to interview Kaunda for Guns and 
Gandhi. After many years in power in a one-party state, he had been defeated in a 
multi-party election, where 81 percent of the popular vote went to his opponent, 
Frederick Chiluba. Kaunda and Sutherland engaged in a lively debate about the 
continued practicality of nonviolence. Kaunda conceded that Gandhi was a saint, but 
he, by contrast, had chosen the path of a politician. Sutherland countered that such 
ideas distort Gandhi’s ideas, since Gandhi stated that an individual did not have to be 
a saint to participate in a nonviolent struggle. Sutherland insisted that nonviolence 
advocates eschew violence not because they are rigid, but because they are trying to 
break a cycle of violence.82 
Kaunda related his ideas on nonviolence to the nature of the state and to human 
nature. Human beings need the state because they imperfectly love God and their 
neighbor. Because of their imperfection, they need an authority, which provides the 
framework of order and justice. Once human beings reach moral and spiritual 
perfection, they will no longer need police, prisons, and oppressive State machinery.83 
While Kaunda certainly shows himself to be a reflective and sensitive person, who 
more than most grappled with the dilemmas of being nonviolent in our current world, 
his comments in the interview as well as in his book veer from the profound moral 
quandary, to the seeming excuses for abuses of power. While it may be the case that 
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contemporary states cannot realistically give up all means of coercion, there are 
matters of degree. Not all of Kaunda’s decisions seem to be as cautious regarding 
wielding coercive power as one might hope, given his sensitive conscience.   
5. Conclusion  
Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Kaunda each used nonviolent methods against the armies 
of the British. Each turned to preventive detention and other repressive measures once 
in power. Each refashioned their state into a one-party system. Each defended the use 
of force by the state as a necessity in our current world of nation-states. Nyerere 
explained, “Once you’ve accepted the nation-state, you accept the consequences—
including armies, including security service bureaucracy, police and the lot.”84 
Before colonial rule, African chiefs would have counselors and listen to their 
people. Even people who threatened the safety of the chief were merely fined as a 
consequence.85 After independence, many African governments incarcerated or even 
killed people for criticizing the president. Is taking “state security” to such extremes 
part of the inheritance of the European-style nation-state?  
Basil Davidson’s The Black Man’s Burden calls the nation-state a curse put upon 
Africa. Perhaps the worst part of the curse is inheriting armies that could do the 
bidding of a president, including trampling on the human rights of the citizens.86 But 
not all nation-states are equal in this trampling. Some nation-states can seriously apply 
themselves to becoming participatory democracies, decreasing the occasions on which 
force is used. A system of checks and balances—like an independent and functioning 
judiciary—can stop the excesses of executive power. 
The timing of each leader’s turn to coercion and violence warrants further 
exploration. Each turned to violence in the early months or years of the newly 
independent state. Possibly each turned to coercion due to a crisis in authority. They 
each attempted to assert their authority in a context where it questioned or challenged 
by incorrigibility.   
Are all states violent by nature? African heads of state inherited armies, police, 
courts and jails based on the Western model, but that does not necessarily entail that 
they would have to accept the use of violence. For Arendt, action, but not violence, is 
central to all politics. Violence is a sign that political action, based on dialog and 
consensual agreement, is breaking down. A state, where the public realm thrives and 
where people can express their diverse views and act politically in concert with each 
other—is always a good thing.87 This model of responsiveness is found in some of the 
examples cited by Mamdani of chiefs responsible to their communities and listening 
with open ears to their counselors.  
While certainly our three Heads of State would easily agree that working out 
problems through dialogue and mutual agreement is preferable to violence and 
coercion, they may state that nevertheless in certain circumstances, nonviolence is a 
luxury that cannot be afforded. Kaunda insisted that one cannot rely on dialogue 
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always solving problems. He knew that Gandhi and nonviolent activists would say 
that the gains of violence are not long lasting; problems not addressed at their root 
causes but “solved” quickly through violence will crop up again. But Kaunda built on 
this metaphor: “War is just like bushclearing—the moment you stop, the jungle comes 
back even thicker, but for a little while you can plant and grow a crop in the ground 
you have won at such terrible cost.”88 Such statements suggest that repeated wars and 
repression are inevitable, but that one should not overlook the small gains in the midst 
of the wars. Kaunda also argued that while his critics might say that colonial tyranny 
was merely replaced by African tyranny, he must point out that even that is still a 
gain—”most people would rather be dragooned by their own kind than by aliens.”89 
He cautioned that he did not want his remark to give the impression that he was not 
opposed to tyranny.  
Certainly any time we critique new African states we must keep in comparative 
context the suffering Africans endured under colonial rule. Our three heads of State 
also had the challenges of being pioneers of a new situation, in “uncharted waters” so 
to speak. Even Gandhi had slim experience in ruling a nation nonviolently. When 
India got its independence, Gandhi bowed out of holding public office. His Indian 
National Congress took over the military and police. Gandhi wrote about how the 
police could be redeployed in development projects, and how armies could become 
superfluous if Indian citizens would organize themselves to repel external aggressors 
nonviolently.90 But these ideas were not implemented, so no one yet knew if they 
would work. Without an alternative precedent, it is not surprising that the African 
Statesmen followed the paths that they took. But this points to a need to develop 
nonviolent strategy to include the neglected later stage of nonviolent statecraft.   
Glenn D. Paige is one contemporary political scientist who is exploring what he 
calls “nonkilling” political science. Paige suggests that states should renounce their 
usually accepted role as those who both threaten and carry out lethal force to “those 
who do not conform to public order.”91 It may be difficult for a state to imagine 
renouncing lethal power since it considers itself to have a duty of providing security. 
But this transformation of the state can come in stages, and can work progressively in 
several states at once. He describes an “unfolding fan of nonkilling alternatives” that 
can begin with high technology interventions in killing zones that reduce fatalities, 
and go further to include socialization and cultural conditioning for nonviolence, and 
to restructuring economies and social stratification so that systems do not “require 
lethality for maintenance.”92 A society which begins by being pro-violent (considering 
state violence to be beneficial for society) can become ambivalent, and then violence-
avoiding (“predisposed not to kill… but prepared to do so” to finally nonviolent (once 
societal conditions have been changed enough to support a nonviolent structure). 93 In 
order to make these changes, there need to be revolutions in education, institutions, 
methods and norms. Certainly it is understandable that news Heads of State who 
inherited state systems that were far from this nonviolent model could not make 
drastic changes overnight. In the short run, their hands may have been tied by lack of 
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concrete alternatives. But such appeals to realism should not preclude seeking the 
longer-term goal of a nonkilling, nonviolent state.  
Gandhi drew a distinction between what he called nonviolence of the strong, and 
nonviolence of the weak. He feared that India was resisting the British nonviolently 
because they considered themselves to be weak, having no choice but to be nonviolent 
since they would fail in use of violence. Gandhi instead wished that the Indian people 
could realize that they came from a great position of strength, due to their greatly 
outnumbering the British as well as their coming from a long spiritual heritage. He 
wanted Indians to have the experience of (psychologically) realizing their strength, 
and then renouncing this ability to do violence. That would be the nonviolence of the 
strong. He began to doubt that his comrades in the movement could do so. But one 
who comes from a position of strength, and then renounces violence, has an 
experience of self-discipline that eludes the weak person.94 It is similar to what Sara 
Ruddick describes as a mother’s renunciation of using violence against her own 
recalcitrant child; she will not use her own size and psychological strength advantage 
against the child but rather restrains her superior power, modeling what Ruddick 
thinks is a helpful model for nonviolence in the political sphere.95 We could 
specula99te that, if during their fights for independence, our three Heads of State had 
more experiences of practicing “nonviolence of the strong,” they could have more 
easily resisted the temptations to use their strength advantage of their new position to 
the detriment of their opponents.  
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